forked from cms/tibi-svelte-starter
apairon
4020ad62c5
- Implemented `resolveApiAssetUrl` function to normalize asset URLs based on API base. - Updated `MedialibImage` component to utilize new asset URL resolution and added support for alt text and class properties. - Enhanced image loading behavior with improved width measurement and focal point handling. - Added placeholder image handling and improved accessibility with alt text. - Introduced new test script for auditing broken links in skill documentation. - Expanded seeded test content to include medialib entries and updated related tests for pagebuilder previews. - Improved global setup and teardown logging for clarity on seeded content management.
263 lines
7.9 KiB
Markdown
263 lines
7.9 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: security-hardening-and-token-strategy
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description: Apply current tibi-server security practices to website projects. Covers token strategy, secret handling, rate limiting, bulk-permission safety, cookie settings, risky hook capabilities, and secure operator decisions for this stack.
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---
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# security-hardening-and-token-strategy
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## When to use this skill
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Use this skill when:
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- setting up or reviewing authentication and token usage on this stack
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- deciding how admin tokens, JWT auth, and token permissions should be used
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- hardening hooks, actions, and project config against current upstream security risks
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- reviewing bulk permissions, rate limiting, cookies, secrets, or risky server-side capabilities
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## Goal
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Keep projects on this starter aligned with the current tibi-server security model and with the security-sensitive operator decisions the stack exposes.
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This is not a generic web-security primer. It is the practical security workflow for this repo family.
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## Source of truth
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Use these sources when implementing or reviewing security decisions:
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- `tibi-server/docs/05-authentication.md`
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- `tibi-server/docs/14-security.md`
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- `tibi-server/docs/17-field-level-permissions.md`
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- `tibi-server/docs/02-configuration.md`
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- project config and collection/action permission YAML files
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## Security review order
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When asked to harden a project, inspect in this order:
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1. secret sourcing in config/env
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2. token type and scope
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3. collection/action permissions
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4. bulk permission exposure
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5. field-level restrictions
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6. rate limiting and cookie settings
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7. risky hook capabilities such as outbound fetch or exec
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This prevents “secure enough” changes that leave the real attack surface untouched.
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## Authentication surfaces
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This stack exposes multiple auth mechanisms. Do not mix them casually.
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- JWT user auth
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- refresh-token cookie flow
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- admin tokens
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- token-based permission sets for narrower machine access
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Recommended default:
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- use JWT user auth for real users and editor/admin sessions
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- use refresh cookies for session continuation where appropriate
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- use admin tokens only for system/admin/ops flows that truly need them
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- use token permissions for narrow machine integrations
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## Token header distinction
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Use the right header for the right surface:
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- system-level API such as project CRUD, admin reload, shutdown: `X-Admin-Token`
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- collection-level CRUD via static project token: `Token`
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- JWT-authenticated user flow: `X-Auth-Token`
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Do not assume a working `Token` header implies system-level admin rights.
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## Secret handling
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Do not keep production secrets as committed literals if the deployment can source them from env or operator-managed secrets.
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Review at minimum:
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- JWT secrets
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- SMTP credentials
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- admin tokens
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- external API keys
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- LLM/embedding provider keys
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If secrets are hardcoded in committed config, treat that as a structural problem, not as cleanup trivia.
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## Bulk permission safety
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Bulk operations are more dangerous than single-document mutations.
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Important rule:
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- boolean `post: true` / `put: true` / `delete: true` does not imply bulk access
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- bulk requires object-form permissions with `bulk: true`
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Example:
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```yaml
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permissions:
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user:
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methods:
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post:
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allow: true
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bulk: true
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```
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Do not enable bulk access casually in website projects. Most editorial workflows do not need it.
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## Field-level security
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Security on this stack is not only collection-method based.
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Review all of these layers together:
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- collection methods
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- `readonlyFields`
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- `hiddenFields`
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- field-level `readonly` / `hidden`
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- eval-based field rules
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- collection visibility in the admin UI
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If a field should not be editable or visible, enforce that on the server. Do not rely on frontend omission.
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## Rate limiting and login hardening
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Current upstream tibi-server supports login rate limiting with exponential backoff.
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Review these config points:
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- `ratelimit.enabled`
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- `ratelimit.loginInitialDelay`
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- `ratelimit.loginMaxDelay`
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- `ratelimit.loginResetAfter`
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Security implication:
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- a project may look fine in normal use while still being too soft against brute-force attempts if rate limiting is not configured as expected
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For serious deployments, do not leave this unreviewed just because login works.
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## Cookie and session hardening
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Refresh-token flows should respect the target environment.
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Review:
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- `api.secureCookies`
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- HTTPS vs local HTTP expectations
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- whether debugging shortcuts are accidentally bleeding into production config
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Do not weaken secure-cookie behavior globally just to make a dev shortcut work.
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## Query-parameter token risk
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Token-based permissions can be passed via query parameters in some cases, but this is a documented risk surface.
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If query tokens are unavoidable:
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- scope them narrowly
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- avoid logging full URLs with sensitive query strings
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- understand proxy, history, and referrer exposure
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Prefer header-based transport whenever possible.
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## Risky hook capabilities
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Current tibi-server exposes powerful capabilities in hooks. Treat them as explicit design decisions, not utilities.
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Particularly important:
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- `context.http.fetch()` / `context.http.fetchStream()` can create SSRF risk
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- `context.exec.command()` can create command-execution risk
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- broad filesystem/network access in hooks should not be treated as harmless
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If a feature can be implemented without shell execution or arbitrary internal fetches, prefer the safer path.
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When such capabilities are used, document:
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- why they are necessary
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- what the allowed target surface is
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- what the safer rejected alternatives were
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## CORS configuration
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CORS follows a hierarchy. Configure it deliberately instead of widening it reactively.
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Levels:
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- server-level `config.yml`
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- project-level `api/config.yml`
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- collection/action-level YAML overrides
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For typical website projects on this starter, the default proxy setup often means no aggressive cross-origin opening is required. Add explicit CORS only when the real deployment needs external origins.
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## Recommended implementation patterns
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### Public form workflow
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Recommended shape:
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- public action with narrow methods
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- server-side validation
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- no admin token in the browser
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- separate internal persistence only when truly required
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### Integration token
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Recommended shape:
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- dedicated narrow token permission set
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- minimal collection/action scope
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- header-based transport preferred
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### Sensitive internal fields
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Recommended shape:
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- use hidden/readonly restrictions explicitly
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- keep admin UI aligned with those restrictions
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- do not let previews depend on hidden-only data
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### Hook that calls external systems
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Recommended shape:
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- fixed or validated targets
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- no user-controlled arbitrary internal fetches
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- no shell execution unless unavoidable
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## Anti-patterns
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- hardcoded production secrets in committed config
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- broad admin tokens used for normal frontend or integration traffic
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- bulk permissions enabled without a concrete operator need
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- risky hook capabilities treated as harmless helpers
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- collection security solved in the UI instead of the server
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- production cookie or rate-limit settings weakened for convenience
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## Verification checklist
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After security-relevant changes, verify all of these:
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1. secrets are sourced appropriately
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2. token type matches the intended actor and scope
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3. bulk permissions are not broader than necessary
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4. readonly/hidden behavior is correct on the API
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5. rate limiting and cookie settings match the environment
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6. risky hook capabilities are constrained by design
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7. `yarn validate` stays clean
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## What an LLM should inspect first
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When asked to harden or design secure access on this starter, inspect in this order:
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1. `tibi-server/docs/05-authentication.md`
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2. `tibi-server/docs/14-security.md`
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3. `tibi-server/docs/17-field-level-permissions.md`
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4. the relevant collection/action permission sets
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5. secret sourcing in config/env
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6. whether hooks use risky capabilities like outbound fetch or exec
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This prevents working implementations that quietly widen the attack surface.
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